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ABSTRACT. This paper is about the nature of writing practice as an existential practice. My purpose is to 
explore dominant ways of speaking about writing practice and explore an alternative way in which writing 
can be seen as existential accomplishment. In the article, I mainly focus on some central themes on the 
writing practice: (a) nature of writing practice (b) issue of criteria, and (c) evaluation practice. For each of 
these themes, I compare dominant ways of speaking about writing as self-discovery or procedural-technical 
practice with a way of speaking drawn from a hermeneutic approach. At the end of the article, I explore a 
possibility for defining a general, but flexible list of existential criteria which may refer to a list of moral 
virtues which aims to provide an outline, and by means of this outline giving some help to writers’ critical 
consciousness. 
Keywords: existential criteria, evaluation practice, existential experience, polyphonic novel, glocal 
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Introduction 
The concept of writing as hermeneutic practice has received a great deal of recent 
attention. Contemporary literature pertaining to hermeneutic approaches to writing 
practice abounds, addressing such matters as how to become a reflective writer and how 
to differentiate types of hermeneutics approaches to writing practice (Kent, 1992; 
Crosswhite, 1992; Russell, 1999). Although arguments supporting writing as hermeneutic 
practice are divergent, they have in common a claim to reject the notion that writing is 
limited to enacting a given set of technical skills or strategies (Pullman, 2000; Russel, 
1999). According to Ward (1994), in the postmodern information age, the natural and 
static definitions and understandings of writing practice have changed as we move away 
from a view of literacy as an autonomous, individually acquired cognitive skill toward a 
view in which literacy is seen as culturally bound, dynamic, meaning-making practice. 
This is a view in which writing practice is considered as a fundamentally social, moral 
and political process rather than as a cognitive activity (Bakhtin, 1981; Freire, 2001; 
Vygotsky, 1986). This view, especially as expanded by recent postmodernist and social 
constructionists (e.g., Bruffee, 1984; Gee, 1992; Kent, 1992; Ward, 1994), replaces a 
cognitivist analysis of literacy, which is largely derived from the traditional Cartesian 
thinking with a socio-cultural view that understands literacy as a fundamentally socio-
political and dialogical accomplishment. In this sense, literacy practices and their 
meanings are always under the influence of a particular context; they embody and 
transform particular ways of thinking, acting, and knowing within specific communities 
(Gee, 1992).  
This paper is about the nature of writing practice as existential experience. My 
purpose is to explore dominant ways of speaking about writing practice and explore an 
alternative way in which writing can be seen as existential accomplishment. I am not, I 
hope and believe, in favour of any instrumental methods, or any ends. The basic 
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assumptions that I make in the paper concern the ontological issues of writing and 
evaluation practice with no fixed foundation.  
In the article, I mainly focus on some central issues on the writing practice: (a) 
nature of writing (b) issue of criteria, and (c) evaluation practice. For each of these 
themes, I compare dominant ways of speaking about writing as self-discovery or 
procedure-process oriented practice with a way of speaking drawn from a hermeneutic 
approach. The former model is committed to and realized by means of a methodology for 
writing; the latter is connected to human existence, who we already are, and who we want 
to become.  
Writing as a self-discovery or procedure-process oriented activity 
In this model, there are two ways of defining writing practice that represent the 
assumptions of epistemological theories,” which is largely derived from traditional 
Cartesian thinking: a-writing as self-discovery, and b- writing as a kind of technical-
procedural activity. 
LeFevre (1987) defines the self-discovery model of writing as “Platonic – 
incomplete view.” According to LeFevre, the act of wring in this incomplete model can 
be defined as “ a private, asocial activity engaged in by an individual who possesses 
innate knowledge to be recollected and expressed, or innate cognitive structures to be 
projected onto the world” (49-50). Cooper (1989) also argues that this model of writing 
can be seen as “limited view” of writing in which the “ideal” writer can be characterized 
as 
isolated from the social world, a writer I will call the solitary author. The 
solitary author works alone, within the privacy of his own mind. He uses 
free writing exercises and heuristics to find out what he knows about a 
subject and to find something he wants to say to others; he uses his 
analytic skills to discover a purpose, to imagine an audience, to decide on 
strategies, to organize content; and he simulates how his text will be read 
by reading it over himself, making the final revisions necessary to assure 
its success when he abandons it to the world of which he is not a part. (4) 
The act of writing in this model can be seen as a simple one way transferal of 
information from one person to others (Murray, 1982; Elbow, 1981; Macrorie, 1985). 
Macrorie defines “good” writing in this model as that which tells the “truth.” According 
to Elbow, the goal of writing is to discover and express the authenticity of personal 
experience, therefore he argues that audiences have the potential to drive a writer away 
from truth, if they are not managed suitably (Ward, 1994). And the purpose of reflection 
in this model of writing is to decide how to proceed in writing practice by making a 
selection from the bodies of knowledge (Bruffee, 1984; Gere 1987; Russel,1999).  
In the second way of defining writing practice, the practice can be seen as a kind 
of technical-procedural activity is the application of a methodology, theoretical and 
instrumental knowledge, to the writing practice in order to gradually remove error in the 
activity, and thus the knowledge produced will be capable of being generalized. 
Knowledge which is used as an instrument or methodology, or produced as a result of 
writing activity, in this model, has some unique characteristics. First, it is propositional; 
that is, it is comprised of a set of statements that can be packaged, scrutinized, and 
transmitted. Second, it is objective knowledge; that is, it is something outside writing 
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practice that researchers draw upon in order to legitimate practice. Furthermore, the 
knowledge produced in the activity can be stored, applied, coded, and quantified. For 
instance, Flower and Hayes’ (1979) process model of composition can be seen as a good 
example of the technical-procedural model of writing. The following figure1 
demonstrates Hayes & Flower's depiction of "the structure of the Cognitive Process 
Model for Writing " (p. 20): 
 
As their flowchart model demonstrates, Hayes and Flower are attempting to split 
the overall writing process into a set of rules that set up authorial concerns in a specific 
sequential order. In this way of looking at writing practice, the practice is limited to 
enacting a given set of technical skills or strategies, and understanding the integration 
means having objective, scientific, instrumental knowledge about it. What makes the 
writing practice objective or scientific is that it is the outcome of the application of 
methods that serve as an instrumental tool to protect the process from the contamination 
of local discourses and socio-politic and economic expectations of members of the local 
community (Gadamer, 1989; Kent, 1992; Russell, 1999; Taylor, 2002). The attitude of 
technical rationality condenses the writing practice to problem-solving. “A problem is 
something that can be totally objectified and resolved in objective terms because the 
person confronting the problem can completely detach himself from it and view it 
externally” (Gallagher, 1992, p. 152). Ontological issues—our ‘being’ in the world as 
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moral-political, social agents—are not part of this model. Ethical concerns in this model 
only play an objective-procedural role as professional ethic in which detachment, 
disinterest and neutrality are the major virtues of writers’’ ethical consciousness   (Ward, 
1994; Carr, 1997).  
Our dominant ways of talking about writing practice from social constructivist 
theory also demonstrate the some characteristics of this model: students "prewrite 
Monday, write Tuesday, revise Wednesday, edit Thursday, and . . . grade Friday to meet 
a district-imposed requirement for progress reporting” (Russell, 1999, p.83). Petraglia 
(1991) argues that social scientism in this model allowed teachers to make the very 
important assertion that an individual's writing process not only could be understood but 
also could be fixed. 
 
A Hermeneutic Approach towards Writing Practice 
Unlike epistemological theories that currently underlie composition theory, a 
hermeneutic approach of understanding for the writing practice places ontological 
questions and issues of selfhood and human agency at centre stage. Ontological 
dimensions of self in this model include: (a) human beings are self-interpreting beings, 
(b) the self is linguistically and historically constructed, (c) the self is dialogic in nature, 
and (d) to know is not separate from to be; a self both functions and interprets (Taylor, 
1991). From a hermeneutic approach, the main concepts of the technical-procedural 
model, which are technical expertise, methodological conformity, instrumental 
rationality, and ethical neutrality, may only play a secondary role in writing practice. The 
main issue in the hermeneutic approach is that we as writers need to primarily come to an 
understanding of our ‘being’ in the world as moral-political, self-interpreting, meaning-
making human agents. We need to realize that our embodied selves are always situated in 
moral and political spaces, and our linguistically and historically constructed, dialogic 
selves are creatures with purposes and goals and see our actions as guided and informed 
by these purposes and goals (Taylor, 1991).  
From a hermeneutic approach, writing is a not a procedure but an existential 
accomplishment, which means it is praxis. Praxis is an activity that differs from 
technique or procedure: “In the first place, the end of a practice is not to produce an 
object or artifact but to realize some morally worthwhile ‘good’” (Carr, 1995, p. 68). 
Praxis has no fixed ends. The ends are constantly revised as “goods” are discerned. 
Praxis, morally worthwhile action, is not about choosing the right knowledge. It is about 
a way of being in the world (Kessels, 1996). The starting point is what it means to be 
ethical. Praxis postures the knower as directly affected by what he knows; knowing and 
being are not distinct in such a way that the knower “stands back” from a situation and 
observes (p. 153). Rather than separating knowledge about the world and being in the 
world, the way an individual knows is the way he or she is in a given context. Seen in this 
way, the writing practice has meaning, but that meaning is not self-contained, waiting to 
be discovered through reflection.  
Praxis involves a self-understanding that is not required in technical “know-how” 
(Gallagher, 1992, p. 153). Technique requires clever application of skills; praxis requires 
understanding. Praxis adequately captures the tension between the interpreter and the 
object of interpretation:  
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Faced with uncertainty and the unfamiliar, praxis does not appeal to ready-
made universal rules that would be applied in a mechanical fashion. 
Rather, action is to be guided by a finite understanding of the actual 
circumstance. Instead of classifying a specific circumstance under an 
already devised set of laws, praxis calls for an application in light of the 
existing situation within which the actor finds herself. In praxis one 
approaches an understanding of the universal in light of the particular, 
rather than the other way around. (p. 153)  
Today, in terms of thinking about writing practice, technique and procedure have 
overcome praxis. As a result, a great deal of attention has been given to the problem of 
“connecting” theory to practice (Wagenaar & Cook, 2003). Much of the contemporary 
discourse pertaining to the integration policy opposes practice and theory.  Theory 
pertains to abstract, universal ideas. Practice pertains to concrete realities (Kent, 1992; 
Ward, 1994; Wagenaar & Cook, 2003). According to Carr (1995): 
In short, by making the twin assumptions that all practice is non-theoretical and 
all theory is non-practical, this approach always underestimates the extent to 
which those who engage in educational practices have to reflect upon, and hence 
theorize about, what, in general, they are trying to do. (p. 62)  
 
A reaction to this concern about the distinction between theory and practice, like 
Schon’s concern with the distinction between knowledge and action, is the 
reconceptualization of practice as preceding theory (Carr, 1995, p. 63). As a result, there 
has been greater interest in locally-generated knowledge. A hermeneutic approach 
describes the writing practice as a way of generating both local knowledge and public 
knowledge about the integration--that is, knowledge developed by and useful to members 
of local communities themselves as well as knowledge useful to the larger society and 
other local communities.  
The hermeneutic way of looking at the writing practice generates a different 
conception of the notions knowledge and criteria. In this model, knowledge is not a 
product of a cognitive, metacognitive, and reflexive activity which can be stored, applied, 
or quantified, but it is experience itself which is always improvisational, incomplete, and 
open to change. Furthermore, the writing practice in this model is more like an existential 
experience, which defines the process as an existential accomplishment, than a technical, 
cognitive activity. This is a view in which writing practice is considered as a 
fundamentally social, moral and political process rather than as a mere cognitive activity. 
This view replaces a modern cognitivist analysis of writing which is largely derived from 
the traditional Cartesian thinking with a socio-cultural view that understands the process 
as a fundamentally socio-political and dialogical accomplishment. 
The way of talking about the issue and nature of criteria in a hermeneutic 
approach is also very different from the traditional epistemological models. Success in 
this approach is not measured in terms of the one best solution, or quantitative results of 
standardized tests.  
Evaluation criteria in the hermeneutic approach are not a procedure or a product 
which can be stored, applied, or quantified, but they are existential experience, an 
unfinished, incomplete language which break the artificial language disengage us from 
our immediate contingency to being. Criterion in this approach is ethical knowledge that 
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“is…not knowledge that we possess in the sense that we can decide whether to apply it or 
even decide whether we are ethically skilled enough to apply it. Rather…we are always 
applying our ethical knowledge, whether adequate or not, in acting as we do” (Warnke, 
2002: 84). That is, there is something about the criteria as ethical knowledge that is not 
detachable from our being but mainly determined by and determinate of it. Moreover, the 
application of the criteria is not straightforward; in other words, we do not simply apply 
them to reach an end. Furthermore, descriptive nature of the criteria in this hermeneutic 
approach is both mutable and relative. First, the criteria in this approach are mutable 
because their definitions change overtime. Therefore, they are always unfinished and 
temporal. Second, the criteria are value rational and contextually relative, because they 
can only be defined within a particular context.  
In general, an existential criterion is a kind of criteria which is both universal and 
flexible. It is a kind of knowledge which is neither global, nor local. It is both global and 
local, which means it is a “glocal2” knowledge. Dewey’s conception of criteria for 
experience could be a good example to further explore the nature of existential criteria.  
Dewey (1938) argues that not all experiences are educative; therefore, for him, we 
need to discriminate educative experiences from those are mis-educative. In order to do 
this, Dewey offers two general principles as criteria of discrimination. These principles or 
criteria are a- continuity of experience, which means all experiences are carried forward 
and influence future experiences, and b-interaction, which means present experiences 
arise out of the relationship between the situation and the individual’s past experiences. 
For Dewey, these criteria should not be seen as a technical tool to impose external control 
over experience, which distorts the growth of further experience, and limits the freedom 
of individuals. Application of the criteria should not be understood as a matter of 
instrumental rationality, a problem-solving based on objective knowledge of how to 
achieve ends. Instead, they are ethical knowledge—knowledge of what is right to do and 
good to be in a given situation. They help individuals have genuine experience, which 
perpetuate emancipation and enlargement of experience and lead individual growth 
through freedom, creativity, and dialogue.  Although the criteria for experience are 
general-“their active union with each other provide the measure of the educative 
significance and value of an experience,” they cannot simply be applied to reach an end, 
they do not accept any fixed, unchanging formulation (Dewey, 1938, p.26). Therefore, 
they are both universal and flexible in their nature. They are existential criteria. 
If there is no universal, objective definitions of existential criteria, and if the 
process of evaluating writing practice by using existential criteria is time and context 
dependent, how can we sure that our evaluation of the text is plausible?, or how can we 
sure that our understanding and definition of existential criteria are something that we can 
trust to evaluate quality of writing process? We may find partial answer to these 
questions while exploring the debate between Habermas and Gadamer on thin-thick 
moralities. For Habermas, “the making of norms is primarily a justice issue, subject to 
principles that state what is equally good for all. Unlike ethical questions, questions of 
justice are not inherently related to specific collectivity and its form of life (Warnke, 
2002, p.88).” While minimizing moralities into universal principles such as truth and 
justice to which every person can hold, Habermas hopes to free communication from a 
particular tradition or its ethnocentric values. By doing this, Habermas hopes society to 
produce democratic judgments, which can have universal application while remaining 
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anchored within the practical realm of discourse among individuals. On the other hand, 
Gadamer argues that we monitor and check on the adequacy of our ethical knowledge, 
our aims and goals not by reconstructing a minimal rational foundation for the universal 
demands of morality, over and beyond our ethical values, but rather by comparing our 
norms and values against other alien thick possibilities of being in the world (Warnke, 
2002). Following Gadamerian ethics and politics, Walzer also argues that morality is 
primarily “thick from beginning and what are expressed in thin moralities simply the 
common or overlapping aspects of a reiterated set of thick values (Warnke, 2002, p.89).” 
Therefore, for Walzer, Habermas’ notion of procedural morality is more than minimal; it 
represents “an entirely decent liberal or social democratic thickness (Warnke, 2002, 
p.89).”    
Consequently, following both Habermas, and Gadamer, I argue that it is possible 
to develop universal-existential criteria, but every attempt to thinning existential criteria 
into a procedure for validating norms would be a failure. All we should and can do as 
writers is to find partial thick definitions to the existential criteria, and compare them 
with other alternative ethical understandings which are at least potentially capable of 
expanding our way of being in the world. Thus, we can check on the adequacy of our 
understanding of existential criteria which are universal but historically conditioned, and 
incomplete. This existential way of looking at the issue of criteria will help us overcome 
objectivism and ethnocentrism in our genuine evaluations in the writing studies.   
For a genuine evaluation, writers need to risk their own self-understanding and 
open themselves to the possibility of a mutually generated new and different 
understanding.  Taylor (2002) argues that genuine evaluation requires a virtue of 
willingness to change  
In which we allow ourselves to be interpellated by the other; in which the 
difference escapes from its categorization as an error, a fault, or a lesser, 
undeveloped version of what we are, and challenges us to see it is a viable 
human alternative. It is this that unavoidably calls our own self-
understanding into question. This is the stance Gadamer calls “openness”. 
“Openness to the other involves recognizing that I myself must accept 
some things that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do 
so” (pp. 141-42) 
For Dewey, this kind of a genuine evaluation will develop a “Growth” in our 
moral consciousness “Towards realization of the potentialities which have already been 
sketched out in the language we are now using-towards realization of our present vaguely 
sensed ideas (cited in Rorty, 1997, p. 526).”  Rorty also argues that this “Growth” is not a 
“… progress towards anything like Truth in the Platonic, realist, sense. Rather, it is 
progress towards new possibilities for humanity-new ways in which men can think of one 
another and do things for one another (p.529).” 
After defining the existential criteria, and analyzing its nature, at this part of the 
paper, I will explore a possibility for defining a general, but at the same time flexible list 
of existential criteria which may refer to a list of moral virtues which aims to provide an 
outline, and by means of this outline giving some help to writers’ critical consciousness. 
I consider at least four existential criteria in the list in order to evaluate the writing 
practice. I argue that when we talk about quality of writing practice in composition 
studies, we need to consider following existential criteria: 
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1- Intellectual maturity, 
2- Practical and political maturity, 
3- Ethical maturity, 
4- Aesthetical maturity 
In the next section, I will try to find partial definitions to these criteria by mostly 
using Bakhtin’s notion of “polyphonic novel” with its characteristics of “carnival” and 
“heteroglossia”.    
 
Heteroglossia, Polyphonic Novel and the Quality of Text 
The four existential criteria mentioned above cannot be neatly separated from 
each other. They are in a transactional relationship. I will define and analyze these four 
criteria in a transactional and dialogical discourse, while considering Bakhtin’s notion of 
“polyphonic novel” with its characteristics of “carnival” and “heteroglossia”.    
Bakhtin’s exploration of the polyphonic text is a democratic, pluralistic, dialogic 
attempt to analyze the hermeneutic notion of writing practice. I believe that Bakhtin’s 
notion of “polyphonic novel” can be used as an excellent source to define the existential 
criteria.       
The first existential criterion is “intellectual maturity.” The intellectually mature 
writing should be “heteroglossic”. Bakhtin (1981) describes “heteroglossia” as the 
multiplicity of voices engaging in dialogue within the text. Heteroglossia focuses on the 
production of meaning through dialogue, and it validates and celebrates the diversity of 
values and voices. Bakhtin uses the “heteroglossia” to criticize the monologic language, 
“monologia,” in order to show constrains and barriers in front of the sphere of dialogic 
speech communication, and the process of “carnivalization.” According to Bakhtin, the 
monologia uses centripetal forces of language, which tend to bring things to a central 
point. On the other hand, heteroglossia uses centrifugal forces of language, which tend to 
move things away from a central point and toward multiplicity. For this reason, 
“heteroglossia” should be the fundamental characteristic of an intellectually mature 
writing. This characteristic generates layered, rich and contextual description, and 
interpretation of the social phenomena. The intellectually mature writing demonstrates an 
artistry that constructs a proper representation of the voices and expectations of addresser 
(the author), addressee (audience), and super-addressee (third person, academia, society, 
etc.) in the text.  
Developing the proper representation of the voices and expectations of addresser, 
addressee, and super-addressee in writing practice is not an easy process. According to 
Bakhtin (1981), every sphere of speech communication produces its own speech genres, 
and its particular language. In order to develop a depth interpretation of the social 
phenomena, or the proper representation of the voices and expectations of members 
(addresser, addressee, and super-addressee) of the particular sphere of communication, 
the speech genres of these particular spheres must be fully mastered by the author(s). 
There is always the possibility for the author of the text to face a tension among 
represented voices in the text. An intellectually mature writing practice should show an 
ethical creativity to find a balance to reduce the tensions among its responsibilities to the 
author (inquirer), society, and readers.  How could the author possibly craft an ethically 
mature text, while validating and celebrating the diversity of values and voices of herself, 
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reader, and society? We can find a proper answer to this question while analyzing 
Bakhtin’s notion of “polyphonic novel.”  
Bakhtin claims that the polyphonic novel is not a direct expression of the author’s 
representation of the world, but an active creation of the representation in the 
consciousnesses of the author, the characters, and the reader, in which all participation is 
equal. In the novel, the author does not preside as a higher authority; just opposite, all 
participants of the dialogue in the text create their own destinies as "free people, who are 
capable of standing beside their creator, of disagreeing with him, and even of rebelling 
against him” (p.4). They are "not only objects of authorial discourse but also subjects of 
their own directly signifying discourse," and the creator of their own destinies. (p.4). On 
the other hand, Bakhtin argues that in the polyphonic novel,  
All people and all things must know one another and know about one 
another, must enter into contact, come together face to face, and talk to 
one another. Everything must be mutually reflected and mutually 
elucidated dialogically. Therefore all things are distant and separated must 
be brought together in a single “point” in space and time.(p.139) 
 
Bringing all things together does not mean the finalization of the representation 
into a single voice. Bakhtin argues that  
Everything in this novel- people’s fates, their experiences and ideas- 
approaches its own borders, everything is, as it were, prepared to become 
its own opposite (although not in an abstract-dialectical sense), everything 
is taken to extreme, to its limits. There is nothing in the novel which could 
become stabilized, nothing which could justifiably settle down contentedly 
within itself and enter into the normal course of biographical time and 
develop in it. (p.139)           
 
According to Bakhtin, in the polyphonic novel, “everything requires change and 
rebirth. Everything is depicted in the moment of uncompleted transition” (p.139-140). 
Bakhtin claims that repositioning the novel in this heteroglossic process requires an 
aesthetical imagination. For this creative process, the freedom of carnival and carnival’s 
aesthetic conception should be used in the novel. According to Bakhtin,  
Carnival is a pageant without a stage and without a division into 
performers and spectators. In the carnival everyone is an active 
participant, everyone communes in the carnival act. Carnival is not 
contemplated, it is, strictly speaking not even played out; its participants 
live in it, they live according to its laws, as long as those laws are in force, 
i.e. they live carnivalistic life. (p.100-101) 
 
Bakhtin describes the carnivalistic life as “…free and unrestricted, full of 
ambivalent laughter, blasphemy, the profanation of everything sacred, full of debasing 
and obscenities, familiar contact with everyone and everything.” (p.130). For this reason, 
he claims that the freedom of carnival and carnival’s aesthetic conception “allows 
Dostoevsky to see and depict aspects of the characters and behavior of people which in 
the normal course of life could not reveal themselves” (p.136).  
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While analyzing aesthetical conception of polyphonic novel, Bakhtin(1984) 
criticizes the dramatic aesthetical conception of Tolstoy’s novels, in which characters, 
sooner or later, come around to the author’s own views of society, ideology, and 
philosophy. Bakhtin explains why this kind of novel in which dramatic language play 
primary role, cannot be polyphonic: 
The speeches in a dramatic dialog do not disrupt the world that is being 
depicted, nor do they make it multileveled; on the contrary, they require 
the monolithic unity of that world in order to be truly dramatic.  The world 
of the drama must be made of a single piece.  Any weakening of the 
monolith leads to a weakening of the dramatic effect…True 
multileveledness would destroy the drama, because dramatic action rests 
upon the unity of the world and is incapable of tying together and 
resolving multiple levels.  In the drama the combination of integral fields 
of vision in a unity which stands above those fields of vision is impossible 
because the dramatic construction offers no support for such unity.  
Therefore the true dramatic dialogue can play only a quite secondary role 
in Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel. (p.13-14) 
 
This critique of dramatic dialogue also reminds us why writers should be careful 
about using centripetal forces of language in their writings. The dramatic dialogue has a 
potential to destroy a democratic and heteroglossic unity of cross-cultural representation 
and understanding. Therefore, the dramatic dialogue should only play a secondary role in 
the inquiry.  
Based on Bakhtin’s notions of “heteroglossia” and “carnival,” I believe that 
writers could use the aesthetic conception of polyphonic novel to properly represent and 
celebrate the diversity of values and voices of themselves, their readers, and society. 
Finally, the practically and politically mature writing practice should be  
carnivalistic, which produces hopes and emancipatory knowledge, in order to open new 
windows in people’s lives, extend the narrow sense of life, and unmask hidden structures 
of power relations in society. According to Bakhtin, “the carnival attitude knows no final 
period, either; it is hostile to any final ending: for it every ending is merely a new 
beginning- carnival images are reborn again and again” (p.138). Therefore, the practically 
and politically mature writing practice should be hostile to any final ending; it should not 
be in the business of “naming” the world. The aim of the practically and politically 
mature writing is to offer new democratic perspectives and opportunities for humanity, 
rather than to change the people’s lives with the grand social projects, which project the 
future of society and then organize to achieve it. As Freire (2001) said,  
Dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the world and those 
who do not wish this naming – between those who deny others the right to 
speak their word and those whose right to speak has been denied them. 
(p.88) 
 
Freire argues that “it is not our role to speak to the people about our own view of 
the world, nor to attempt to impose that view on them, but rather to dialog with the 
people about their view and ours.” (p.96). Thus, the practically and politically mature 
writing should be open to represent multiple interpretations and understanding of the 
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world, in order to develop a multiple analysis of the social situations, create democratic 
strategies, and hope for social transformation and emancipation.  
 
Conclusion 
Writing is an existential experience which cannot be detached from who we 
already are, and who we want to become. It is an existential accomplishment in which we 
break old sense of community and develop new possibilities for humanity. It is an 
existential experience in which we overcome cynicism, the disbelief in shared values of 
the democratic communities, and perpetuate the democratic, pluralistic nature of an open 
society. It is not a technical enterprise which aims to eliminate uncertainty, ambiguity, 
and unpredictability of the everyday life by using general, systematic foundational 
knowledge, methods. It negotiates with the ambiguous and unpredictable world by acting 
upon it, or interacting with it. In other words, it touches life, speaks language of life, the 
most elementary words of being, which is to fully live, to fully be. “Openness,” an ability 
of changing ourselves, our pre-understandings and prejudgments through dialog is the 
“true revolution,” the main goal of writing experience. 
This article is an attempt to explore an ontological way of talking about issues of 
nature of writing practice, criteria, and evaluation. In this article, I broadly compared a 
procedural-expressivist and a hermeneutic model for understanding the experience of 
writing. And, I argued for the inevitability and inescapability of existential criteria, and 
the possibility of using the existential criteria for generating a general, but flexible and 
practical outline, a list of moral virtues. My discussion of the issue of criteria is more an 
ontological analysis than a theoretical one. This does not mean that I aim to develop a 
binary opposition between the epistemological issues and ontological issues of writing 
practice, or that I underscore the importance of epistemological analysis of the nature of 
criteria and quality text; instead, my aim is to remind writers about the importance of 
ontological analysis of open text to evaluate the quality of their writings, and to depict 
what “writing” might be when we look at the writing experience from the ontological 
perspective.     
This article provides a post-foundational and existential framework with the 
theoretical and philosophical principles of a democratic and dialogical pedagogy for 
academicians and elementary and secondary school teachers, who teach writing and 
composition courses at public schools and universities, in order to help them understand 
the essence of teaching socially just, politically and emotionally motivated, democratic 
and pluralistic way of teaching writing and composition. The article aimed to show that 
teaching writing is more than providing and teaching technical knowledge and cognitive 
tools such as cognitive apprenticeship, interpersonal skills, collaborative problem-solving, 
and coaching and supervision; teaching writing is existential, ethical, poetical, political, 
aesthetical, deliberative, emotional, creative, reflective and dialogical process. This 
proposal is not suggesting another fixed and cognitive model of writing to define what 
teaching writing and composition "really" is. Rather, it explores teaching writing as 
another way we are in the world, and bring our notions of “practice” and “good writing” 
closer to the realities of everyday life activities. This alternative view emphasizes the 
shared nature of dialogical and existential writing through three concepts: situated 
cultural activity, writing as a socio-individual accomplishment, and writing as a 
deliberative and action oriented critical process. Writing is understood as a social 
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accomplishment that is embedded in everyday activities situated in school cultures that 
are social, cultural, moral and practical in nature, where interactions with others are an 
important medium in which writing and teaching composition occurs. This alternative 
view of writing and teaching composition requires deliberation and dialogue, and the 
exchange of ideas where writing itself is not contained wholly in the mind of the 
individual but is shared through socio-political discourses and artifacts that are embedded 
in the social activity of the school community. For example, action research, 
collaborative planning, transformative publishing, creative writing, whole language, kid-
watching, etc. are the practical examples of teaching writing and composition to students, 
especially at the elementary school level. 
I believe that a hermeneutic way of looking at issues of criteria, evaluation, and 
writing practice may give new insights to teachers, policy makers, program evaluators, 
politicians, researchers about their understanding and conceptualization of freedom, 
justice, education, democracy, international relations, cross-cultural evaluation and 
communication.  
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Notes  
                                                 
1
 Obtained from http://faculty.goucher.edu/eng221/Flower1.gif  
2
 Glocal: This term is derived from terms of “Globalization” and “Localization”. 
